# Linux 7.5 introduces kcore= boot parameter to optionally restrict memory access

> **Key takeaway:** A new boot parameter allows administrators to disable /proc/kcore to prevent processes with CAP_SYS_RAWIO from reading the entire system memory.

**Published:** 2026-11-19T22:03:06+00:00 
**Source:** Phoronix Benchmarks &amp; Drivers 
**Category:** kernel-os 
**Canonical URL:** https://fosswire.org/news/linux-75-introduces-kcore-boot-parameter-to-optionally-restr.html 

## Summary
A new patch queued for the Linux 7.5 merge window introduces a mechanism to optionally disable access to the /proc/kcore virtual file at boot time. This file, which provides a view of physical memory and kernel virtual address space in ELF format, is a significant security concern if a process gains high-level hardware access privileges.

While /proc/kcore is essential for live kernel debugging and memory forensics, it currently presents a large read primitive for any process possessing the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability. The upcoming change allows system administrators to disable this interface using a new boot parameter without needing to compile custom kernels or use restrictive lockdown modes.

## Security implications of /proc/kcore access
- **New Boot Parameter:** The `kcore=off` parameter allows users to disable the /proc/kcore interface during the boot process, provided the kernel was compiled with `CONFIG_PROC_KCORE`.
- **Privilege Escalation Risk:** Access to /proc/kcore is currently granted to any process with `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`, which can expose the entire kernel virtual address space and reveal KASLR (Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization) layouts.
- **Granular Control:** Unlike the `lockdown=confidentiality` mode, which disables various debugging features like kprobes and BPF probes, this new parameter provides a surgical way to disable memory reading via procfs while keeping other kernel features intact.
- **Implementation Status:** The patch has been integrated into the `vfs-7.5.procfs` branch of the VFS Git repository and is expected to enter the Linux 7.5 merge window soon.

## Why it matters
This change simplifies security hardening for system administrators and cloud providers who need to run a single, standard kernel image across both debugging-heavy and high-security environments. It allows for better isolation by ensuring that hardware-level access (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) does not automatically grant full system memory visibility.